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ABSTRACT In recent years, the Internet of Things (IoT) devices have become increasingly deployed in
many industries and generated a large amount of data that needs to be processed in a timely and efficient
manner. Using aggregate signatures, it provides a secure and efficient way to handle large numbers of digital
signatures with the same message. Recently, the privacy issue has been concerned about the topic of data
sharing on the cloud. To provide the integrity, authenticity, authority, and privacy on the data sharing in the
cloud storage, the notion of an aggregatable certificateless designated verifier signature scheme (ACLDVS)
was proposed. ACLDVS also is a perfect tool to enable efficient privacy-preserving authentication systems
for IoT and or the vehicular ad hoc networks (VANET). Our concrete scheme was proved to be secured
underling of the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. Compared to other related schemes, our scheme
is efficient, and the signature size is considerably short.
INDEX TERMS Certificateless signature, aggregate signature, designated verifier, privacy, authentication,
vehicular ad hoc network (VANET), wireless sensor network (WSN).

I. INTRODUCTION

A wireless sensor network (WSN) is made up of a large
number of sensor nodes, which are densely deployed very
close to each other. It has the advantages of low cost, high
efficiency and low latency. The protocols and algorithms used
in the wireless sensor network must possess self-organizing
capabilities. A sensor node has an onboard processor, and
it can be used to process simple computations locally and
transmits only the necessary and partially processed data back
to the requested node. This cooperative effort of sensor nodes
is one of the unique and attractive features of wireless sensor
networks.
The above-described feature ensures a wide range of applications for wireless sensor networks, for example, healthcare,
military, and security. For healthcare application, a doctor
can securely monitor the wearable health devices. With consent from the patient, the wearable health devices allow the
doctor to have a better understanding of the patient’s current
condition. However, the generated patient’s medical reports
from these devices could leak the privacy of the patient,
and, hence, there should be appropriately handled and be
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
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protected. The data and its signature transmitting between
the sensor devices and the monitor have to be encrypted
to provide confidentiality and authenticity. It can be done
merely implementing the SSL/TLS protocol. Nevertheless,
it ensures only confidentiality and authenticity, but it does
not preserve the privacy of the patient. For the privacy of
a patient, it can be achieved by implement the designated
verifier signature instead of the general signature. Moreover,
to save the cost of the communication and computation,
the aggregate signature scheme can be applied to limit the
amount of the data needed to transmit through the network.
The data and its signature can be gathering at the sensor
gateway, then the sensor gateway aggregates them into a
single signature and passes it to the monitor server. The detail
of this implementation is described in [10].
With the rapid growth of the application of various Internet
of Things (IoT) devices and the development of wireless
communication technology especially for WSN, the topic of
vehicular ad hoc networks (VANET) has attracted significant
interest and attention. In VANET, Vehicles equipped wireless devices can communicate with each other. The main
objective of VANET is to set up and maintain a communication network among vehicles without using any centralized
network architecture based base station [26]. One of the

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

95019

P. Thorncharoensri et al.: Aggregatable Certificateless DVS

examples of the VANET applications, the critical medical
emergencies in a place with no access to any communication
infrastructure, it is vital to pass on the information that could
save human lives. Lack of support in VANET, it has put
additional responsibility on each vehicle that is part of the
network. Every node must maintain and forward the communication on this network to other nodes. In the United State,
the intelligent transportation systems (ITS) implement the
Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) that operates around the 5.9 GHz frequency band. The DSRC consists
of RoadSide units (RSUs) and On-Board Units (OBUs) that
have transceivers and transponders. A vehicle with OBUs
can communicate with another vehicle with OBUs directly,
which is called Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) communication.
Meanwhile, a vehicle with OBUs that communicates with a
Road Side Unit (RSU) is known as Vehicle-to-Infrastructure
(V2I). Each vehicle in VANET can operate in both modes of
communication simultaneously. More details of VANET can
be found in [25].
However, the rapid movement of the nodes affect the
stability of the network route and the large scale of nodes
in the network caused communication delays, is a significant problem on VANET that could not be ignored [9]. The
concept of certificateless public key cryptography has been
recommended to secure the communication in the VANET,
and avoid the complexity associated with managing public
key certificates and the drawbacks of the key escrows in
identity-based cryptography [25], [26], [29], [30]. For the
public key management in cryptography, Certificate Authority(CA) is commonly utilized to certify the public key. However, it is a security weak point in the VANET, which creates
a single point of failure. In the VANET enviroments, where
the perspective of limited bandwidth and the dynamic nature
of the networks are crucial. A compromised AC will put the
security of the whole VANET in risk, and the collapsing of
the communication in the network is unavoidable. Hence,
the efficient key agreement and distribution in VANET is
strategically assigned to certificateless cryptography. In some
specific applications, the signatures on the same message
generated by different nodes need to be compressed to reduce
the cost of transmission and verification computation due
to the bandwidth and storage constrained environments. The
above issue can be solved with an aggregate signature which
can reduce the cost of verification, and the length of the
signature. It was designed to be effective in the bandwidth
and storage constrained environments.
A. RELATED WORK

Since the seminal introduction of digital signature notion [11]
and its formalization [12], the notion of digital signatures has
been extended to capture different scenarios and situations in
real life. With a public-private keys pair, it allows a signer
with a private key to produce a signature on the message and
lets anyone verify this signature with a public key.
A designated verifier signature (DVS) provides both
authenticity and deniability properties at the same time. It was
95020

proposed by Jakobsson, Sako and Impagliazzo in [19]. The
authenticity property ensures that a signer indeed signs this
digital signature. The deniability property ensures that only
the designated verifier can verify the validity of this digital
signature signed by the signer. Moreover, this conviction
cannot be transferred to any other third party. It has been
widely studied and extended to many areas [13], [16], [18],
[21], [22], [24], [32]–[35], [37].
Laguillaumie and Vergnaud were first to propose
a multi-designated verifiers signature scheme (MDVS)
in [21]. Later, Thorncharoensri et al. [35] introduced a
policy-controlled signature (PCS) which is a variant of
MDVS in the attributed based topics. They also proposed
the extension schemes in [37]. The signature size of MDVS
schemes is linear to the number of the designated verifiers,
while the signature size of PCS schemes is linear to the
number of the attribute in the policy, but it does not limit the
number of the designated verifiers. There are many variants
of DVS, such as the universal designated verifier signature (UDVS) scheme [32], [36] where a delegator can sign
on behalf of the signer, the one-time UDVS scheme where
a signature can be recover if the delegator produced more
than one universal designated verifier signature, ID-based
DVS [33], and proxy DVS [16].
The certificateless public key cryptography was first proposed by Al-Riyami and Paterson in [2]. Unlike the traditional public key cryptography that needs a certificate to
ensure the authenticity of the public keys, certificateless
public key cryptography does not require the use of any
certificate. The formal security definitions of certificateless
signature (CLS) schemes have been intensively discussed by
Au et al. in [3], Huang et al. in [15] and Huang et al. in [17].
Karati et al. [20] put forward the lightweight certificateless
signature that can be run on restricted computation devices.
However, it was proven to be insecure by Zhang et al. [39].
Later, Yang et al. [38] illustrates the public key replacement
attack on the Zhang et al.’s improved CLS scheme [39].
The used of certificateless aggregate signature on VANETs
application was demonstrated by Cui et al. [9]. They also proposed an efficient certificateless aggregate signature scheme
for the VANETs which does not require bilinear pairing. The
certificateless public key cryptography in the standard model
was proposed by Canard and Trinh in [7].
In some applications such as Multicast applications which
may allow data sending from the leaf nodes to gather at
the branch node before pass to the root node. This leads
to a many-to-one communication pattern. To ensure authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation, the cost of verification
computation and bandwidth is linear to the size of the leaf
nodes. This leads to the propose of the aggregate signature
scheme in 2003 by Boneh et al. [6]. An aggregate signature
refers to an aggregation of n signatures of n messages signed
by n signers, by an aggregation algorithm, into a single
signature. The verifier only needs to verify this aggregate
signature, which confirms whether or not the signature is
from the specified n users. Aggregate signatures not only
VOLUME 8, 2020
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reduce the cost of verification but can also reduce the length
of the signature that is transmitted and can be valuable in
environments constrained for bandwidth and storage. Since
the proposed of the aggregate signature scheme, it has been
widely studied and expanded in many areas. Recently, due to
the popularity of the IoT topics, the compact and lightweight
certificateless aggregate signature schemes were proposed in
[10], [14], [23]. Deng et al. proposed a certificateless short
aggregate signature in [10]. It is efficient in the signing and
verifying process where requires only two pairing operations
in the verification, and the size of the signature is only one
point on the elliptic curve and some state of information.
However, the state of information must be shared among
signers (devices) before each signer can sign on a message.
This causes another issue in securely generated a shared state
of information. Hashimoto and Ogata introduced a compact
and unrestricted certificateless aggregate signature which the
signature’s size is constant. Their concrete scheme shares the
similarity to Deng et al.’s concrete scheme; however, the former scheme is much flexible. It does not need to share a state
of information for every time the signer generates a signature.
Li et al. recently proposed the most efficient certificateless
aggregate signature scheme in [23]. The concrete scheme
does not require the bilinear pairing, and it also allowed the
scalar multiplication over E/Fq to be computed offline and
store them for later use. Therefore, it is suitable for limited
computation power IoT devices.
Huang et al. was first introduced the notion of certificateless designated verifier signature schemes in [18]. Recently,
many certificateless designated verifier signature schemes
were proposed [13], [22], [28], [31]. Rastegari et al. [28] provided intensive security reviews on certificateless designated
verifier signature schemes and they gave a conclusion on the
suitable security model for certificateless designated verifier
signature schemes. They also proposed a concrete scheme in
a standard model. Shen et al. introduced the certificateless
aggregate signature with the designated verifier (CLASDV)
in [31]. In this scheme, the aggregator acts as a delegator
in the universal designated verifier signature scheme which,
given a signature from the original signer, he/she can generate a designated verifier signature on behalf of the original
signer. Unlike the aggregator in our scheme, he/she can only
aggregate the signature to reduce the communication cost and
cannot generate a designated verifier on behalf of the signers.
Our goal to construct the aggregatable certificateless designated verifier signature scheme (ACLDVS) is not a simple
task by combining or modifying the above-mentioned works.
There is no generic DVS scheme that can convert an existing
DVS scheme to ACLDVS. Combining certificateless signature, aggregate signature and designated verifier signature
together is not a trivial process. For example, in Shen et al.
CLASDV scheme [31], it can only achieve privacy through
the aggregator. The privacy of the signer is not preserved since
the beginning.
Since our scheme is unique and applicable for many
applications, our comparison with other schemes is aims
VOLUME 8, 2020

to compare in term of performance. our scheme position
in the balance of communication cost, performance and
privacy-preserving. Hence, the well-known related signature
schemes [9], [18], [20] were chosen for the comparison in
Section V.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS

In this paper, we concentrate on providing a designated verifier signature that can simultaneously aggregate by any party;
however, only the designated verifier can prove the validity of
this aggregate designated verifier signature.
Our reliable and efficient certificateless aggregate designated verifier scheme solves the aforementioned problems in
integrity, authentication, and privacy. Compared with other
certificateless aggregate signature and certificateless designated verifier schemes, our scheme has better performance
as follows.
1) Our concrete scheme does not employ expensive bilinear pairings and map-to-point hash functions, hence,
our scheme can easily implement on most of IoT
devices. Since our scheme has a unique property that it
is a combination of aggregate signature, designated verifier signature and certificate less signature schemes,
we compared our scheme to well known efficient
schemes in those areas. The results of the comparison
are in the Table 2 and Figure 1 to 5.
2) Our concrete scheme satisfies the requirements of
unforgeability in [28] as we demonstrated our security
proofs in Section IV-A.
3) Our concrete scheme provides a signer privacy preservation in the aspect of deniability; hence, none other
than designated verifier can verify the validity of the
signature. This property is due to the transcript simulation, which it is indicated that the designated verifier
can also generate the signature.
Paper Organization: The organization of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, some notation and
definitions used throughout this paper is described. The definition of an aggregatable certificateless designated verifier
signature (ACLDVS) and its security notions are described
in Section III. In the following section, the construction of
the efficient ACLDVS scheme is described with its security
proof. Finally, the comparison of our scheme with other
schemes and the conclusion of the paper will be presented
in the last two sections.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. NOTATION

The following notations will be used in the rest of this paper.
A function f : N → R is negligible when, for all constant
c > 0 and for all sufficiently large n, f (n) < n1c . poly(.)
is a deterministic polynomial function. Let [n] represent a
series of numbers(or indexes), e.g., if n is integer then [n] =
{0, . . . , n}. Hence, for all polynomials poly(k) and for all
sufficiently large k, we say that q is polynomial-time in k if
95021
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q ≤ poly(1k ). Denote by l ← L the operation of picking l
at random from a (finite) set L. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 be
a collision-resistant hash function. Let h : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p be
a collision-resistant hash function. Let e be the base of the
Natural Logarithms.
B. BILINEAR PAIRING

Let G1 and G2 be the cyclic multiplicative groups where
their generators are g1 and g2 respectively. Let p be a prime
and the order of both generators. Let GT be another cyclic
multiplicative group with the same order p. Let ê be an
efficient algorithm. We denote by ê : G1 × G2 → GT a
bilinear mapping with the following properties:
1) Bilinearity: ∀(g1 ∈ G1 ; g2 ∈ G2 ; a, b ∈ Zp ) :
ê(ga1 , gb2 ) = ê(g1 , g2 )ab .
2) Non-degeneracy: ∃ g1 ∈ G1 ∃ g2 ∈ G2 : ê(g1 , g2 ) 6 = 1.
3) Computability: ∃ ê : ∀ g1 ∈ G1 , ∀ g2 ∈ G2 ;
ê(g1 , g2 ) ∈ GT
Note that there exists ϕ(.) function which maps G1 to G2 or
vice versa in one-unit time.
C. COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTIONS

Definition 1 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem): Given a 3-tuple (g, gχ , gψ ∈ G1 ) as input, output gχ ·ψ .
An algorithm A has advantage  0 in solving the CDH problem
if


Pr A(g, gχ , gψ ) = gχ·ψ ≥  0
where the probability is over the random choice of χ , ψ ∈ Z∗q
and the random bits consumed by A.
Assumption 1 (Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption [5], [11]): We say that the (t,  0 )-CDH assumption holds
if no PPT algorithm with time complexity t(.) has an advantage at least  0 in solving the CDH problem.

partial private key (pskU ) and the public parameter
(ppkU ) of a user. That is,
PPK(param, IDU , skK ) → (ppkU , pskU ).
Noted that U is represented the user who may be a
signer or a verifier.
Setup User Secret Value (SetSV):
Given param and a user identity IDU as input,
a probabilistic algorithm SetSV outputs the Secret
Value (svU ) of the user. That is,
SetSV(param, ID) → svU .
Setup User Private Key (SetSK):
Given param, the user identity IDP, pskU and svU
as input, a probabilistic algorithm SetSK outputs
the private key (skU ) of the user. That is,
SetSK(param, ID, pskU , svU ) → skU .
Setup User Public Key (SetPK):
Given param and the user identity IDU as input,
a probabilistic algorithm SetPK outputs the public
key (pkU ) of a signer. That is,
SetPK(param, IDU ) → (pkU ).
Signature Signing (Sign):
Given param, skS , pkS , pkV and a message M
as input, a probabilistic algorithm Sign outputs a
signer’s signature δ. That is,
Sign(param, M , skS , pkS , pkV ) → δ.
Aggregate (Aggregate):
Given param, U, δ1 , . . . , δn and M as input, a probabilistic algorithm Aggregate outputs a signer’s
signature σ That is,
Aggregate(param, U, M , δ1 , . . . , δn ) → σ.

III. AGGREGATABLE CERTIFICATELESS DESIGNATED
VERIFIER SIGNATURE SCHEMES (ACLDVS)

In this section we will propose our aggregatable certificateless designated verifier signature schemes (ACLDVS). There
are three main players which are a trusted authority KGC who
issues keys associated with its public key to the rest,a verifier
V and a signer S who generates a signature that can be verified
only by a specified verifier V . Let ID = {ID1 , . . . , IDn } be a
set of n identities and U = ID ∪ {pk i : IDi ∈ ID} be a set of
identity and public key of n users.
System Parameter Generation (Setup):
Given a security parameter ` as input, a probabilistic algorithm Setup outputs the system parameter
param and the private key (skK ) of a trusted authority. That is,
Setup(1` ) → param, skK .
Extract Partial Private Key (PPK):
Given param, a user identity IDU ∈ {0, 1}∗ and skK
as input, a probabilistic algorithm PPK outputs the
95022

Verification (Verify):
Given param, skV , U, M and σ as input, a deterministic algorithm Verify outputs a verification decision d ∈ {accept, reject}. That is,
Verify(param, M , σ, U, skV ) → d.
Transcript Simulation (Sim):
Given param, skV , U, M as input, a probabilistic
algorithm Sim outputs a simulated signature σ That
is,
Sim(param, M , U, skV ) → σ̂ .
A. SECURITY MODEL OF AGGREGATABLE
CERTIFICATELESS DESIGNATED VERIFIER SIGNATURE
SCHEMES

In ACLDVS, there are two models of the attack which
describe with different capabilities:
Type I: In this type of the attack, an adversary AI does
not have access to the master key. However, it has an
VOLUME 8, 2020
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TABLE 1. Queries.

ability to replace any public key and/or obtain the most
of signers’ secret keys (but at least one signer’s secret
key and one verifier’s secret key must remain secret to
AI ). Given the above ability with the public parameter and
queries in Table 1, AI can choose messages with adaptive
strategies and submit them to the signing oracle. Finally,
if AI can output a valid message-signature pair that have
never been queried before, then AI is successful in the
attack.
Type II: In this type of the attack, an adversary AII has
access to the master key. However, it doesn’t have an ability
to replace any public key of its own choice. Given the above
ability with the public parameter and queries in Table 1,
AI can choose messages with adaptive strategies and submit
them to the signing oracle. Finally, if AI can output a valid
message-signature pair that have never been queried before,
then AI is successful in the attack.
IV. OUR SCHEME

The ACLDVS scheme is described as follows.
Setup : On input a security parameter `, KGC
randomly chooses a prime p ≈ poly(1` ). Let G1 ,
G2 and GT denote three groups of prime order p.
Let ê be the bilinear mapping function, which maps
G1 and G2 to GT . The above mapping function
is defined as ê : G1 × G2 → GT . To generate
a public parameter, first, select a random integer
a ∈ Z∗p . Choose a random generator g ∈ G1 and
a bilinear mapping function ê. Construct a function
ϕ : G1 → G2 and compute o = ϕ(g) ∈ G2 .
Select hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and h :
{0, 1}∗ → Z∗p . Compute W = ga . Set skK = a
and param = (p, ê, g, o, W , H , h). Then, Setup
returns (param, skK ).
PPK : With param, skK and IDU ∈ {0, 1}∗ as
input, PPK randomly generates pskU as follows:
select random an integer µU ∈ Z∗p . Let ppkU =
(TU = gµU ) and compute lU = h(IDU ||TU ). Let
pskU = dU = µU + lU · a. Then, PPK returns
(ppkU , pskU ).
VOLUME 8, 2020

SetSV : With param and IDU ∈ {0, 1}∗ as input,
SetSV randomly generates svU as follows: select
random integers xU , yU , zU ∈ Z∗p and set svU =
(xU , yU , zU ).
SetSK : With param, svU , pskU and IDU ∈ {0, 1}∗
as input, SetSK sets skU = (xU , yU , zU , dU ).
SetPK : With param, ppkU , svU and IDU ∈
{0, 1}∗ as input, SetPK randomly selects an integer
η ∈ Z∗p . Let XU = gxU , YU = gyU , ZU =
gzU . Next, it computes BU = gηU , γU =
h(IDU ||BU ||TU ||XU ||YU ||ZU ), cU = ηU + dU · γU .
Finally, it outputs pkU = (XU , YU , ZU , TU , BU , cU )
for a user U .
Sign : With param, skS , pkV , IDS ∈ {0, 1}∗ , IDV ∈
{0, 1}∗ and M ∈ {0, 1}∗ as input, Sign randomly
generates a signature δ on message M as follows:
1) Select random integers rS ∈ Z∗p .
2) Verify pkV by computing γV = h(IDV ||BV
||TV ||XV ||YV ||ZV ) and checking whether
?
gcV = BV · (TV · W lV )γV
3) Compute lV = h(IDV ||TV ).
4) Compute RS = grS ; βS = h(m||RS ||YV zS
||pkV ||pkS ).
5) R̂S = (TV · W lV )rS · ZV βS ·dS .
6) Compute αS = h(m||R̂S ||RS ||XV yS ||pkV
||pkS ).
7) δ̄S = YV rS · R̂S · XV αS (xS +zS ) .
8) δS = (δ̄S , RS ).
Aggregate : Let R = {R1 , . . . , Rn }. With param,
U, δ1 , . . . , δn and M ∈ {0, 1}∗ as input, Aggregate
generates a signature σ on message M as follows:
σ = (σ̄ =

n
Y

δ̄i , R)

i=1

Verify : With param, U, σ , skV and M ∈ {0, 1}∗
as input, Verify checks whether the below equations
hold or not.
1) Compute li = h(IDi ||Ti ) : ∀IDi ∈ U,
2) Verify each pki by computing γi
=
h(IDi ||Bi ||Ti ||Xi ||Yi ||Zi ) and checking
?
whether gci = Bi · (Ti · W li )γi
3) βi = h(m||Ri ||Zi yV ||pkV ||pki ) : ∀Ri ∈ R,
4) R̂i = Ri dV · (Ti · W li )βi ·zV : ∀Ri ∈ R, and
5) αi = h(m||R̂i ||Ri ||Yi xV ||pkV ||pki ) : ∀IDi ∈ U.
Q
Q
? Q
6) Check σ̄ = ni=1 Ri yV · ni=1 R̂i · ni=1 (Xi ·
Zi )αi ·xV .
If it does not hold, then Verify outputs reject.
Otherwise, it outputs accept.
Sim : With param, U, skV , IDV ∈ {0, 1}∗ and M ∈
{0, 1}∗ as input, Sim randomly generates a signature
σ on message M as follows:
1) Select random integers r1 , . . . , rn ∈ Z∗p .
2) Compute li = h(IDi ||TV ) : ∀IDi ∈ U.
95023
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3) Verify each pki by computing γi
=
h(IDi ||Bi ||Ti ||Xi ||Yi ||Zi ) and checking
?
whether gci = Bi · (Ti · W li )γi .
4) Compute Ri = gri : ∀IDi ∈ U,
5) βi = h(m||Ri ||Zi yV ||pkV ||pki ) : ∀IDi ∈ U,
6) R̂i = (Ri )dV · (TV · W lV )βi ·zV : ∀IDi ∈ U, and
7) αi = h(m||R̂i ||Ri ||Yi xV ||pk
QnV ||pkiy)V : ∀ID
Qni ∈ U.
8) Finally,
compute
σ̄
=
R
·
i=1 i
i=1 R̂i ·
Qn
αi ·xV .
(X
·
Z
)
i
i=1 i
9) Output a signature σ = (σ̄ , R).
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS

Theorem 1: The ACLDVS scheme is designated verifier
signature scheme.
Proof: The verification of ACLDVS requires xU , yU , zU
and dU which are the secret key of the designated verifier. From the Sim algorithm, the designated verifier also
can generate a valid signature by using his/her secret key
(xU , yU , zU , dU ). Hence, the signature produced by the designated verifier is indistinguishable from the signature produced by the signer. To be precise, this signature cannot
confirm its validity by a third party.

Theorem 2: The ACLDVS scheme is existentially unforgeable under Type-I adversary AI attack model, if the CDH
assumption holds in the random oracle model.
Proof: Assume that there exists a forger algorithm AI
running the existential unforgeability game defined in Section
III-A. Then we will show that, by using AI , an adversary F
solves the CDH problem.
Initialization: on input g, gχ and gψ as an instance of the
CDH problem, F runs Setup and sets g = g, W = gχ and
obtains (param = (p, ê, g, o, W , h), skK = χ).
Queries: The following queries are constructed by AI
before running the simulation.
Hash − Q : On a request for a hash value of a string
0 (h(0)), Hash − Q check whether 0 in the queried
list or not. If it exists in the list then return the corresponding value, otherwise, Hash − Q randomly
$
chooses ι ← Zp then returns h(0) = ι. Hash − Q
keeps (0, ι) in its list and the list can be accessed
only by F. Let o˛H be a number of the hash queries.
PPK − Q : With IDi ∈ {0, 1}∗ as input, PPK − Q
randomly generates pski as follows: select random
integers µi li ∈ Z∗p . Let ppki = (Ti = gµi −li χ ) and set
h(IDi ||Ti ) = li . PPK − Q outputs pski = di = µi .
However, if the input identity is ID∗V , will abort the
simulation. Let o˛pp be the list of queried IDi in the
PPK − Q queries. PPK − Q returns (ppkU , pskU ).
SV − Q : With IDi ∈ {0, 1}∗ as input, SV − Q
selects random integers xi , yi , zi ∈ Z∗p , sets svi =
(xi , yi , zi ). Then, SK − Q returns svi for IDi . However, if the input identity is ID∗V , it will abort the
simulation. Let o˛sk be a number of the queries with
the IDi in the list Lsk .
SK − Q : Since PPK − Q and SV − Q queries can
be used to obtain the same result with this type
95024

of query, hence, for this attack model, we simply
ignore its construction.
PK − Q : With IDi ∈ {0, 1}∗ as input, PK − Q runs
SetPK to output pki = (Xi = gxi , Yi = oyi , Zi =
ozi , Ti ) for a user U . However, if the input identity is
ID∗S , it randomly picks xS ∗ , yS ∗ , µS ∗ , kS ∗ , jS ∗ , ∈ Z∗p ,
sets γS ∗ = kS ∗ = h(ID∗S ||BS ∗ ||TS ∗ ||XS ∗ ||YS ∗ ||ZS ∗ )
in Hash − Q and calculates BS ∗ = gjS ∗ (TS ∗ ·
W lS ∗ )−kS ∗ , cS ∗ = jS ∗ . It outputs pkS ∗ = (XS ∗ =
gxS ∗ , YS ∗ = gyS ∗ , TS ∗ = gµS ∗ , γS ∗ , cS ∗ ) for ID∗S .
If the input identity is ID∗V , it randomly selects
xV ∗ , yV ∗ , µV ∗ , kV ∗ , jV ∗ ∈ Z∗p , sets γV ∗ = kV ∗ =
h(ID∗V ||BV ∗ ||TV ∗ ||XV ∗ ||YV ∗ ||ZV ∗ ) in Hash − Q
and calculates BV ∗ = gjV ∗ (TV ∗ · W lV ∗ )−kV ∗ , cV ∗ =
jV ∗ . It outputs pkV ∗ = (XV ∗ = gxV ∗ , YV ∗ =
gµV ∗ , ZV ∗ = gψ·zV ∗ , TV ∗ = gµV ∗ ) for ID∗V . Let
o˛pk be a number of the queries with the IDi in the
list Lpk .
ˆ i as input,
RPK − Q : With IDi ∈ {0, 1}∗ and pk
RPK − Q uses IDi to get the corresponding pki
ˆ i . In order for
from SetPK and replaces it with pk
ˆ
pki to pass the public key verification, RPK − Q
ˆ i . However, for ID∗ ,
recomputes TU , BU , cU for pk
S
RPK − Q randomly chooses ki , ji ∈ Z∗p , sets γi =
ki = h(IDi ||Bi ||Ti ||Xi ||Yi ||Zi ) and calculates Bi =
gji (TV ∗ · W lV ∗ )−ki , ci = ji . The list Lrpk keeps (IDi ,
ˆ i ). If svi that is corresponded with pk
ˆ i had
pki ,pk
ˆ
been queried, then the record (IDi , pki ,pki ) will be
removed from the list. Intuitively, Lrpk keeps only
the records that F cannot simulate the signature due
to the lack of knowledge of the corresponding sv.
Moreover, if the input identity is ID∗V , it will abort
the simulation. Let o˛rpk be a number of the queries
in the list Lrpk .
Sign − Q : With M ∈ {0, 1}∗ , IDV and U as input,
Sign − Q runs Sign or Sim for all signature queries
except a signature query for ID∗S as a signer and ID∗V
as a verifier. Sign − Q outputs the signature for ID∗S
as a signer and ID∗V as follows:
1) Select random integers ṙS ∗ ∈ Z∗p .
2) Verify pki by computing γi = h(IDi ||Bi ||Ti
?
||Xi ||Yi ||Zi ) and checking whether gci = Bi ·
(Ti · W li )γi
3) Run Hash − Q to obtain lV ∗ = h(IDV ∗ ||TV ∗ )
and lS ∗ = h(IDS ∗ ||TS ∗ ).
ψ·z ∗ ·β ∗ ·l ∗
4) Let rS ∗ = ṙS ∗ − V l ∗S S
V
5) RS ∗ = grS ∗
6) βS ∗ = h(m||RS ∗ ||YV ∗ zS ∗ ||pkV ∗ ||pkS ∗ )
7) R̂S ∗ = (TV ∗ · W lV ∗ )rS ∗ · ZV ∗ βS ∗ ·dS ∗
(ṙ ∗ −

ψ·zV ∗ ·βS ∗ ·lS ∗

lV ∗
= (gµV ∗ +lV ∗ ·χ ) S
·(gψ·zV ∗ )(βS ∗ ·µS ∗ +βS ∗ ·lS ∗ ·χ )

= gµV ∗ ·ṙS ∗ +lV ∗ ·χ·ṙS ∗ · g

−

−

·g

)

µV ∗ ·ψ·zV ∗ ·βS ∗ ·lS ∗
lV ∗

lV ∗ ·χ ·ψ·zV ∗ ·βS ∗ ·lS ∗
lV ∗

VOLUME 8, 2020

P. Thorncharoensri et al.: Aggregatable Certificateless DVS

·gψ·zV ∗ ·βS ∗ ·µS ∗ +χ·ψ·zV ∗ ·βS ∗ ·lS ∗
= gµV ∗ ·ṙS ∗ +lV ∗ ·χ·ṙS ∗
·g

−

µV ∗ ·ψ·zV ∗ ·βS ∗ ·lS ∗
lV ∗

·g−χ ·ψ·zV ∗ ·βS ∗ ·lS ∗ · gψ·zV ∗ ·βS ∗ ·µS ∗
·gχ·ψ·zV ∗ ·βS ∗ ·lS ∗
µV ∗ ·ṙS ∗ +lV ∗ ·χ ·ṙS ∗

=g

·g

−

·g

µV ∗ ·ψ·zV ∗ ·βS ∗ ·lS ∗
lV ∗

= ((g

ψ·zV ∗ ·βS ∗ ·µS ∗

=g

= gµV ∗ ·ṙS ∗ · (gχ )lV ∗ ·ṙS ∗
(gψ ) V
z

µ ∗ ·l ∗
∗ ·βS ∗ (µS ∗ − Vl S
V∗

)

.

8) Obtain αS ∗
=
h(m||R̂S ∗ ||RS ∗ ||XV ∗ yS ∗
||pkV ∗ ||pkS ∗ ).
α ∗ (x ∗ +z ∗ )
9) δ̄S ∗ = YV ∗ rS ∗ · R̂S ∗ · XV S∗ S S .
10) δS ∗ = (δ̄S ∗ , RS ∗ ).
Sign − Q outputs δS ∗ for the query of a signature on
M , ID∗S and ID∗V . Let o˛s be a number of the queries
in the list Ls .
Verify − Q : With M ∈ {0, 1}∗ , δ, IDV and U as
input, Verify − Q runs Verify for all IDi . If IDV
is IDV ∗ and IDS ∗ ∈ U, checks whether the below
equations hold or not.
1) Run Hash − Q to obtain lV ∗ = h(ID∗V ||TV ∗ )
and li = h(IDi ||Ti ) : ∀IDi ∈ U.
2) βi = h(m||Ri ||YV ∗ zi ||pkV ∗ ||pki ) : ∀Ri ∈ R
3) Compute R̂i = Ri dV ∗ · (XV ∗ )di : ∀Ri ∈ R.
y
4) Make a query for αi = h(m||R̂i ||Ri ||XVi∗
∗
||pkV ||pki ) : ∀IDi ∈ U to Hash − Q.
? Qn
5) Check
Qn ê(σ̄ , o) =
Qn i=1 ê(Ri , YV )· α
ê( i=1 R̂i , o) · i=1 ê(Xi · Zi , XV ∗ ) i .
If it does not hold, then Verify outputs reject.
Otherwise, it outputs accept.
Phase I: The simulation is begun by giving an access to
the above queries to AI . Noted that AI always makes a query
for a any string (or message) to Hash − Q oracle before it
outputs a potential forgery.
Phase II: At the end of the simulation, after executing an
adaptive strategy with the above queries, AI outputs a forgery
σ ∗ on a message M ∗ with ID1 , . . . , IDn ∈ U∗ : ∃IDi ∈
/
(Lsk ∧ Lpp ) and IDV ∗ ∈
/ (Lsk ∧ Lpp ). AI wins the game if a
signature σ ∗ on the message M ∗ with U, IDV ∗ , pk V ∗ is valid
and it was not an output from the Sign − Q queries.
Solve CDH Problem: To solve CHD problem, the Forking
technique in [4], [27] is applied. F first obtains a signature σ ∗
on message M ∗ where h(m||RS ∗ ||YV ∗ zS ∗ ||pkV ∗ ||pkS ∗ ) = r˙S
Simultaneously F resets AI to the initial state and repeats
again the above simulation with a different hash value
h(m||RS ∗ ||YV ∗ zS ∗ ||pkV ∗ ||pkS ∗ ) = r¨S . Eventually, AI outputs
another signature σ 0 . Finally, F computes
1
σ̄ ∗ z ∗ · l ∗ (r˙ − r¨ )
S
S
S
Z=( 0) V
σ̄
VOLUME 8, 2020

1
δ̄∗S z ∗ · l ∗ (r˙ − r¨ )
S
S
S
=( 0) V
δ̄S
1
ZV ∗ r˙S ·dS ∗ z ∗ · l ∗ (r˙ − r¨ )
S
S
S
=(
) V
ZV ∗ r¨S ·dS ∗

gχ·ψ = (

ψ·zV ∗ (µS ∗ +lS ∗ ·χ)(r˙S −r¨S )

)

ψ·µS ∗
lS ∗

1
· l (r˙S − r¨S )
S∗

gχ ·ψ

Z
gψ

)z

V∗

µS ∗
lS ∗

)

Probability: Let A be the success probability ADVAI (.)
that AI outputs a forgery. Let F be the success probability
ADVEUF−CMA (.) that AI wins the above simulation and C
the success probability ADVCDH (.) that F solves the CDH
problem. The success probability in solving CDH problem by
using AI is based on the Forking Lemma in [4], [27]. Some
notation will be defined first.
A : The success probability ADVAI (.) that AI outputs a
forgery.
F :
The success probability ADVEUF−CMA (.) that AI
wins the above simulation
C ; The success probability ADVCDH (.) that F solves
the CDH problem.
E1 :
The simulation does not abort in PPK − Q queries
E2 :
The simulation does not abort in SV − Q queries
E3 :
The simulation does not abort in RPK − Q queries
E4 :
The simulation does not abort after AI outputs the
forgery
Noted that it is a fact that o˛H  o˛s ≥ o˛rpk ≈ o˛pp ≈ o˛sv ≈
o˛pk from the nature of the aforementioned simulation. The
success probability in solving CDH problem is described as
follows:
F = A · Pr[E1 |E2 |E3 |E4 ]
1
1
= A · (1 −
)o˛pp · (1 −
)o˛sv
o˛pp + 1
o˛sv + 1
1
1
·(1 −
)o˛rpk ·
o˛rpk + 1
o˛pk
o˛pp
o˛sv
= A ·
·
e · (o˛pp + 1) e · (o˛sv + 1)
o˛rpk
1
·
·
e · (o˛rpk + 1) o˛pk
o˛H
o˛H
≥ A ·
·
e · (o˛H + 1) e · (o˛H − 1)
o˛H
1
·
·
e · (o˛H + 1) o˛pk
A · o˛H 3
· o˛pk · (o˛H + 1)3
A
∴ F ≈ 3
e · o˛pk
≥

e3

(1)
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acc
1
− l)
o˛H
2
1
F
− l)
F (
o˛H
2
2
F
F
− l
o˛H
2
2
F
o˛H
F 2
o˛
√H
o˛H C

C ≥ frk ≥ acc(
frk ≥
frk ≥
frk >
C >
∴ F <

(2)

From (1) and (2),
A
√
≤ o˛H C
2
e · o˛pk
∴ A ≈ e · o˛pk 2 ·

√
o˛H C

(3)

F
Noted that l is negligible, hence, it is omitted. To sum2
marize the probability, AI wins the above game and outputs
∗
a signature σ on a message M ∗ with a probability of e3 · o˛pk ·
√
o˛H C . The above success probability shows that our aggregatable certificateless designated verifier signature scheme
secures against existentially unforgeable under an adaptive
chosen message attack in the Type-I adversary model if the
success probability of solving CDH problem is negligible. 
Theorem 3: The ACLDVS scheme is existentially unforgeable under Type-II adversary AI attack model, if the CDH
assumption holds in the random oracle model.
Proof: For The type-I adversary attack model, hence,
the KGC secret key is compromised, hence,
Assume that there exists a forger algorithm AII running
the existential unforgeability game defined in Section III-A.
Then we will show that, by using AII , an adversary F solves
the CDH problem.
Initialization: on input g, gχ and gψ as an instance of the
CDH problem, F runs Setup and sets g = g and obtains
(param = (p, ê, g, o, W , h), skK = a).
Queries: The following queries are constructed by AII
before running the simulation.
Hash − Q : On a request for a hash value of a string
0 (h(0)), Hash − Q check whether 0 in the queried
list or not. If it exists in the list then return the corresponding value, otherwise, Hash − Q randomly
$
chooses ι ← Zp then returns h(0) = ι. Hash − Q
keeps (0, ι) in its list and the list can be accessed
only by F. Let o˛H be a number of the hash queries.
PPK − Q : With IDi ∈ {0, 1}∗ as input, PPK − Q
randomly generates pski as follows: select random
integers µi ∈ Z∗p . Let ppki = (Ti = gµi ) and
compute li = h(IDi ||Ti ). PPK − Q outputs pski =
di = µi +li ·a. Let o˛pp be the list of queried IDi in the
PPK − Q queries. PPK − Q returns (ppki , pski ).
SV − Q : With IDi ∈ {0, 1}∗ as input, SV − Q
selects random integers xi , yi , zi ∈ Z∗p , sets svi =
95026

(xi , yi , zi ). Then, SK − Q returns svi for IDi . However, if the input identity is ID∗S or ID∗V , it will abort
the simulation. Let o˛sk be a number of the queries
with the IDi in the list Lsk .
SK − Q : With IDi ∈ {0, 1}∗ as input, SK − Q
selects random integers xi , yi ∈ Z∗p , runs
PPK − Q to obtain (ppki , pski ) and SV − Q to
obtain (xi , yi , zi ). Next, it sets ski = (xi , yi , zi , di ).
Then, SK − Q returns ski for IDi . However, if the
input identity is ID∗S or ID∗V , it aborts the simulation.
Let o˛sk be a number of the queries with the IDi in
the list Lsk .
PK − Q : With IDi ∈ {0, 1}∗ as input, PK − Q runs
SetPK and outputs pki = (Xi = gxi , Yi = oyi , Zi =
ozi , Ti ) for a user U . However, if the input identity
is ID∗S or ID∗V , it randomly picks xS ∗ , yS ∗ , zS ∗ , µS ∗ ,
xV ∗ , yV ∗ , zV ∗ , µV ∗ , ηS ∗ , ηV ∗ ∈ Z∗p . Next, it computes BS ∗ = gηS ∗ , γS ∗ = h(ID∗S ||BS ∗ ||TS ∗ ||XS ∗
||YS ∗ ||ZS ∗ ), cS ∗ = ηS ∗ + dS ∗ · γS ∗ , BV ∗ =
gηV ∗ , γV ∗ = h(ID∗V ||BV ∗ ||TV ∗ ||XV ∗ ||YV ∗ ||ZV ∗ ),
cV ∗ = ηV ∗ + dV ∗ · γV ∗ . Finally, it outputs pkS ∗
= (XS ∗ = gχ xS ∗ , YS ∗ = gyS ∗ , ZS ∗ = gzS ∗ , TS ∗ =
gµS ∗ , BS ∗ , cS ∗ ) for a user S ∗ and pkV ∗ = (XV ∗ =
x ∗
y ∗
gψ V , YV ∗ = gψ V , ZV ∗ = gzV ∗ , TV ∗ =
gµV ∗ , BV ∗ , cV ∗ ) for a user V ∗ . Let o˛pk be a number
of the queries with the IDi in the list Lpk .
Sign − Q : With M ∈ {0, 1}∗ , IDV and U as input,
Sign − Q runs Sign or Sim for all signature queries
except a signature query for ID∗S as a signer and ID∗V
as a verifier. It will compute the signature for ID∗S
as a signer and ID∗V as follows:
1) Select random integers rS ∗ , r̂S ∗ ∈ Z∗p .
2) Run Hash − Q to obtain
lV ∗ = h(IDV ∗ ||TV ∗ ).
3) Verify pki by computing
γi = h(IDi ||Bi ||Ti ||Xi ||Yi ||Zi )
?

4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)

and checking whether gci =∗Bi · (Ti · W li )γi
∗
∗
∗
Let ṙS ∗ = −( χ ·xV ·rSyV·x∗ S +rˆS ) .
RS ∗ = gṙS ∗ .
βS ∗ = h(m||RS ∗ ||YV ∗ zS ∗ ||pkV ∗ ||pkS ∗ )
R̂S ∗ = RS ∗ dV ∗ · ZV ∗ βS ∗ ·dS ∗ .
Set h(m||R̂S ∗ ||RS ∗ ||XV ∗ yS ∗ ||pkV ∗ ||pkS ∗ ) =
rS ∗ .
r ∗ (χ·xS ∗ +zS ∗ )
δ̄∗S = YV ∗ rS · R̂S ∗ · XVS∗
.
−ψ·y

∗ ∗ ∗
∗
∗ ( χ ·xV ·rS ·xS +rˆS )

V
yV ∗
· R̂S ∗ ·
=g
∗ ·r ∗ (χ·x ∗ +z ∗ )
ψ·x
V
S
S
S .
g
∗
∗
∗
∗
= g−χ·ψ·xV ·rS ·xS −ψ·rˆS ) · R̂S ∗ ·
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
gψ·χ·xV ·rS ·xS +ψ·xV ·r∗ S ·zS ) .
∗
∗
∗
= R̂S ∗ · gψ(xV ·rS ·zS −rˆS ) .
10) δ∗S = (δ̄∗S , RS ∗ ).
Sign − Q outputs δ∗S for the query of a signature on
M , ID∗S and ID∗V . Let o˛s be a number of the queries
in the list Ls .
VOLUME 8, 2020

P. Thorncharoensri et al.: Aggregatable Certificateless DVS

Verify − Q : With M ∈ {0, 1}∗ , δ, IDV and U as
input, Verify − Q runs Verify for all IDi . If IDV
is IDV ∗ and IDS ∗ ∈ U, checks whether the below
equations hold or not.
1) Run Hash − Q to obtain lV ∗ = h(ID∗V ||TV ∗ )
and li = h(IDi ||Ti ) : ∀IDi ∈ U.
2) βi = h(m||Ri ||Zi zV ∗ ||pkV ∗ ||pki ) : ∀Ri ∈ R
3) Compute R̂i = Ri dV ∗ · ZV ∗ βi ·di : ∀Ri ∈ R.
4) Make a query for
αi = h(m||R̂i ||Ri ||Yi xV ∗ ||pkV ∗ ||pki ) :
∀IDi ∈ U
to Hash − Q.
? Qn
∗
5) Check
ê(
σ̄
,
o)
=
Q
Q i=1 ê(Ri , YV )·
ê( ni=1 R̂i , o) · ni=1 ê(Xi · Zi , XV ∗ )αi .
If it does not hold, then Verify outputs reject.
Otherwise, it outputs accept.
Phase I: The simulation is begun by giving skK and an
access to the above queries to AII . Noted that AII always
makes a query for a any string (or message) to Hash − Q
oracle before it outputs a potential forgery.
Phase II: At the end of the simulation, after executing
an adaptive strategy with the above queries, AII outputs a
forgery σ ∗ on a message M ∗ with ID1 , . . . , IDn ∈ U∗ :
∃IDi ∈
/ (Lsk ∧ Lpp ) and IDV ∗ ∈
/ (Lsk ∧ Lpp ). AII
wins the game if a signature σ ∗ on the message M ∗ with
U, IDV ∗ , pk V ∗ is valid and it was not an output from the
Sign − Q queries.
Solve CDH Problem: To solve CHD problem, the Forking
technique in [4], [27] is applied. F first obtains
a signature σ ∗
yS ∗
∗
∗
∗
on message M where h(m||R̂S ||RS ||XV ∗ ||pkV ∗ ||pkS ∗ ) =
r˙S Simultaneously F resets AII to the initial state and
repeats again the above∗ simulation with a different hash
y
value h(m||R̂∗S ||RS ∗ ||XVS∗ ||pkV ∗ ||pkS ∗ ) = r¨S . Eventually, AII
outputs another signature σ 0 . Finally, F compute
1
σ̄ ∗ y ∗ · x ∗ (r˙ − r¨ )
V
S
S
Z=( 0) S
σ̄
1
δ̄∗S y ∗ · x ∗ (r˙ − r¨ )
V
S
S
=( 0) S
δ̄S
1
(XS ∗ · YS ∗ )r˙S ·xV ∗ ·ψ y ∗ · x ∗ (r˙ − r¨ )
V
S
S
=(
) S
(XS ∗ · YS ∗ )r¨S ·xV ∗ ·ψ
ψ · xV ∗ (r˙S − r¨S )
χ ·xS ∗
yS ∗ yS ∗ · xV ∗ (r˙S − r¨S )
= (g
·g )
x ∗

χ·ψ· yS ∗

=g
gχ ·ψ = (

· gψ

S

Z yxS ∗∗
)S
gψ
x ∗

=(

(g

χ·ψ· yS ∗

gψ
χ·ψ

=g
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S

· gψ )

yS ∗

) xS ∗

Probability: Let A be the success probability ADVAII (.)
that AII outputs a forgery. Let F be the success probability
ADVEUF−CMA (.) that AII wins the above simulation and C
the success probability ADVCDH (.) that F solves the CDH
problem. The success probability in solving CDH problem by
using AII is based on the Forking Lemma in [4], [27]. Some
notation will be defined first.
A : The success probability ADVAII (.) that AII outputs
a forgery.
F :
The success probability ADVEUF−CMA (.) that AII
wins the above simulation
C ; The success probability ADVCDH (.) that F solves
the CDH problem.
E1 :
The simulation does not abort in SK − Q queries
E2 :
The simulation does not abort after AII outputs the
forgery
Noted that it is a fact that o˛H  o˛pk > o˛sk from the nature
of the aforementioned simulation. The success probability in
solving CDH problem is described as follows:
F = A · Pr[E1 |E2 ]
1
1
)o˛sk ·
= A · (1 −
o˛sk + 2
o˛pk · (o˛pk − 1)
=
≈
∴ F ≈
C ≥ frk ≥
frk ≥
frk ≥
frk >
C >
∴ F <

A (o˛sk + 1)2
· (o˛pk − 1) · (o˛sk + 2)2

e · o˛pk
A
e · o˛pk 2
A
e · o˛pk 2
acc
1
acc(
− l)
o˛H
2
1
F
− l)
F (
o˛H
2
2
F
F
− l
o˛H
2
2
F
o˛H
F 2
o˛
√H
o˛H C

(4)

(5)

From (1) and (2),
A
√
≤ o˛H C
2
e · o˛pk
∴ A ≈ e · o˛pk 2 ·

√
o˛H C

(6)
F
Noted that l is negligible, hence, it is omitted. To sum2
marize the probability, AII wins the above game and outputs
∗
a signature σ on a message M ∗ with a probability of e · o˛pk 2 ·
√
o˛H C . The above success probability shows that our aggregatable certificateless designated verifier signature scheme
secures against existentially unforgeable under an adaptive
chosen message attack in the Type-II adversary model if the
success probability of solving CDH problem is negligible. 
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TABLE 2. The comparison of three certificateless signature schemes.

FIGURE 1. Key generation processing time.

FIGURE 2. Signature generation processing time.

V. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENTAL
RESULTS

Our ACLDVS schemes captures the need of authenticity and
privacy-preserving in the limited computation environment.
The comparison between our scheme and other schemes
in Table 2. We denoted n as the number of the signers participated in the signing process for the aggregate signature
scheme. Let E denote a computation of exponential in G1
or GT . Let M be a computation of scalar multiplication
95028

in G1 . Let P be a computation of bilinear pairing function ê.
A computation of hash functions from {0, 1}∗ to G1 is denoted
as H . and the computation of hash function from {0, 1}∗ to
Zp is denoted as h. Since the multiplication and addition
computation in Zp is trivial, they are omitted.
The experiments were using the Pairing-Based Cryptography Library (PBC) provided by [8]. The code was
written in Python using the Charm-Crypto framework developed by Akinyele et al. [1] for the rapid cryptography
VOLUME 8, 2020
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FIGURE 3. Signature verification processing time.

FIGURE 4. Key validation processing time.

FIGURE 5. Total processing time.

development. The first experiment was conducted on Intel
Xeon CPU model X5650 with CPU clocked at 2.67 GHz
with 2 cores and 4 threads configuration with 16 Gigabytes
VOLUME 8, 2020

of ECC DDR3 memory. The operating system used in this
experiment is Ubuntu 18.04. The second experiment was
conducted on Raspberry Pi4 Cortex-A72 (ARM v8) 64-bit
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SoC with CPU clocked at 1.5 GHz with 4 cores configuration
and 4 Gigabytes of DDR4 memory. Raspbian is the operation
system used in the second experiment.
both experiments were executed with 224 bit of MNT
(Type D in PBC) curves. Type D curve with 224 bit size
of group element is a curve that has a short size for the
group elements, and it is considerably fast for the bilinear
pairing computation. It achieved the security comparable to
the 1344 bits (6 x 244 bits) of discrete logarithm (DLog)
security.
Each experiment was conducted by first randomly selected
one verifier (only for the designated verifier scheme). The
number of signers participated in the simulation were start
from 1 to 200 signers with a unique identity for each signer.
In each round of the simulation, the number of signers participated in the signing were increased by one. In each round,
the simulator ran the KGC for signers to extract the partial
private-public key pair before process the key validation,
signing and verification. A message used in the experiment
has been randomly generated in each round with a fixed size
of 30 bytes. From the results in Figure 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5,
our ACLDVS shows the positive result in every experiment.
Even through it cannot surpass the Cui et al.’s ALCS scheme
in some parts, it was significant compared to the other two
schemes and benefited from the designated verifier property
over the Cui et al.’s ALCS scheme.
VI. CONCLUSION

Privacy issue over the information shared in the cloud storage
or in the VANET without an efficient and proper control
mechanism has motivated us to provide schemes resolving
it. The notion of a aggregatable certificateless designated
verifier signature scheme captures the need for the integrity,
authenticity, authority, and privacy, which presents as a perfect tool to enable efficient privacy-preserving authentication
systems for VANET. Moreover, our ACLDVS signature is
aggregatable, which it is helpful in reducing the communication cost in the ad hoc network environment.
REFERENCES
[1] J. A. Akinyele, C. Garman, I. Miers, M. W. Pagano, M. Rushanan,
M. Green, and A. D. Rubin, ‘‘Charm: A framework for rapidly prototyping cryptosystems,’’ J. Cryptograph. Eng., vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 111–128,
Jun. 2013.
[2] S. S. Al-Riyami and K. G. Paterson, ‘‘Certificateless public key cryptography,’’ in Proc. 9th Int. Conf. Theory Appl. Cryptol. Inf. Secur., in
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2894. Taipei, Taiwan: Springer,
Nov./Dec. 2003, pp. 452–473.
[3] M. H. Au, Y. Mu, J. Chen, D. S. Wong, J. K. Liu, and G. Yang, ‘‘Malicious
KGC attacks in certificateless cryptography,’’ in Proc. 2nd ACM Symp. Inf.,
Comput. Commun. Secur. (ASIACCS), 2007, pp. 302–311.
[4] M. Bellare and G. Neven, ‘‘Multi-signatures in the plain public-key model
and a general forking lemma,’’ in Proc. 13th ACM Conf. Comput. Commun.
Secur. (CCS), Alexandria, VA, USA, 2006, pp. 390–399.
[5] D. Boneh, ‘‘The decision Diffie–Hellman problem,’’ in Proc. 3rd Int.
Symp. Algorithmic Number Theory (ANTS), in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1423. Portland, OR, USA: Springer-Verlag, Jun. 1998,
pp. 48–63.
[6] D. Boneh, C. Gentry, B. Lynn, and H. Shacham, ‘‘Aggregate and verifiably
encrypted signatures from bilinear maps,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Theory Appl.
Cryptograph. Techn., in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2656.
Warsaw, Poland: Springer, May 2003, pp. 416–432.
95030

[7] S. Canard and V. C. Trinh, ‘‘Certificateless public key cryptography in the
standard model,’’ Fundam. Inf., vol. 161, no. 3, pp. 219–248, Jul. 2018.
[8] A. De Caro and V. Iovino, ‘‘JPBC: Java pairing based cryptography,’’ in
Proc. IEEE Symp. Comput. Commun. (ISCC), Corfu, Greece, Jun. 2011,
pp. 850–855.
[9] J. Cui, J. Zhang, H. Zhong, R. Shi, and Y. Xu, ‘‘An efficient certificateless
aggregate signature without pairings for vehicular ad hoc networks,’’ Inf.
Sci., vols. 451–452, pp. 1–15, Jul. 2018.
[10] L. Deng, Y. Yang, and Y. Chen, ‘‘Certificateless short aggregate signature
scheme for mobile devices,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 87162–87168, 2019.
[11] W. Diffie and M. Hellman, ‘‘New directions in cryptography,’’ IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory, vol. IT-22, no. 6, pp. 644–654, Nov. 1976.
[12] S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, and R. L. Rivest, ‘‘A digital signature scheme
secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks,’’ SIAM J. Comput.,
vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 281–308, Apr. 1988.
[13] S. Han, M. Xie, B. Yang, R. Lu, H. Bao, J. Lin, H.-B. Hong, M.-X. Gu, and
S. Han, ‘‘A certificateless verifiable strong designated verifier signature
scheme,’’ IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 126391–126408, 2019.
[14] K. Hashimoto and W. Ogata, ‘‘Unrestricted and compact certificateless
aggregate signature scheme,’’ Inf. Sci., vol. 487, pp. 97–114, Jun. 2019.
[15] X. Huang, Y. Mu, W. Susilo, D. S. Wong, and W. Wu, ‘‘Certificateless
signature revisited,’’ in Proc. 12th Australas. Conf. Inf. Secur. Privacy,
Townsville, QLD, Australia, Jul. 2007, pp. 308–322.
[16] X. Huang, Y. Mu, W. Susilo, and F. Zhang, ‘‘Short designated verifier
proxy signature from pairings,’’ in Proc. Workshops Embedded Ubiquitous Comput. (EUC), in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3823.
Nagasaki, Japan: Springer-Verlag, Dec. 2005, pp. 835–844.
[17] X. Huang, W. Susilo, Y. Mu, and F. Zhang, ‘‘On the security of certificateless signature schemes from Asiacrypt 2003,’’ in Proc. 4th Int. Conf.
Cryptol. Netw. Secur., in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3810.
Xiamen, China: Springer, Dec. 2005, pp. 13–25.
[18] X. Huang, W. Susilo, Y. Mu, and F. Zhang, ‘‘Certificateless designated
verifier signature schemes,’’ in Proc. 20th Int. Conf. Adv. Inf. Netw. Appl.
(AINA), Vienna, Austria, Apr. 2006, pp. 15–19.
[19] M. Jakobsson, K. Sako, and R. Impagliazzo, ‘‘Designated verifier proofs
and their applications,’’ in Proc. Int. Conf. Theory Appl. Cryptograph.
Techn. (EUROCRYPT), in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1070.
Saragossa, Spain: Springer-Verlag, May 1996, pp. 143–154.
[20] A. Karati, S. H. Islam, and M. Karuppiah, ‘‘Provably secure and
lightweight certificateless signature scheme for IIoT environments,’’ IEEE
Trans. Ind. Informat., vol. 14, no. 8, pp. 3701–3711, Aug. 2018.
[21] F. Laguillaumie and D. Vergnaud, ‘‘Multi-designated verifiers signatures:
Anonymity without encryption,’’ Inf. Process. Lett., vol. 102, nos. 2–3,
pp. 127–132, Apr. 2007.
[22] J. Li, N. Qian, Y. Zhang, and X. Huang, ‘‘An efficient certificate-based
designated verifier signature scheme,’’ Comput. Informat., vol. 35, no. 5,
pp. 1210–1230, 2016.
[23] K. Li, M. H. Au, W. H. Ho, and Y. L. Wang, ‘‘An efficient conditional
privacy-preserving authentication scheme for vehicular ad hoc networks
using online/offline certificateless aggregate signature,’’ in Proc. 13th Int.
Conf. Provable Secur., in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 11821.
Cairns, QLD, Australia: Springer, Oct. 2019, pp. 59–76.
[24] H. Lipmaa, G. Wang, and F. Bao, ‘‘Designated verifier signature schemes:
Attacks, new security notions and a new construction,’’ in Proc. 32nd Int.
Colloq. Automat., Lang. Program. (ICALP), in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3580. Lisbon, Portugal: Springer-Verlag, Jul. 2005,
pp. 459–471.
[25] A. K. Malhi, S. Batra, and H. S. Pannu, ‘‘Security of vehicular ad-hoc
networks: A comprehensive survey,’’ Comput. Secur., vol. 89, Feb. 2020,
Art. no. 101664.
[26] B. Mokhtar and M. Azab, ‘‘Survey on security issues in vehicular ad hoc
networks,’’ Alexandria Eng. J., vol. 54, no. 4, pp. 1115–1126, Dec. 2015.
[27] D. Pointcheval and J. Stern, ‘‘Security arguments for digital signatures and
blind signatures,’’ J. Cryptol., vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 361–396, Jun. 2000.
[28] P. Rastegari, W. Susilo, and M. Dakhilalian, ‘‘Certificateless designated
verifier signature revisited: Achieving a concrete scheme in the standard
model,’’ Int. J. Inf. Secur., vol. 18, no. 5, pp. 619–635, Oct. 2019.
[29] S. Sharma and B. Kaushik, ‘‘A survey on Internet of vehicles: Applications, security issues & solutions,’’ Veh. Commun., vol. 20, Dec. 2019,
Art. no. 100182.
[30] M. S. Sheikh, J. Liang, and W. Wang, ‘‘A survey of security services,
attacks, and applications for vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs),’’ Sensors, vol. 19, no. 16, p. 3589, Aug. 2019.
VOLUME 8, 2020

P. Thorncharoensri et al.: Aggregatable Certificateless DVS

[31] L. Shen, J. Ma, Y. Miao, and H. Liu, ‘‘Provably secure certificateless aggregate signature scheme with designated verifier in an improved security
model,’’ IET Inf. Secur., vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 167–173, May 2019.
[32] R. Steinfeld, L. Bull, H. Wang, and J. Pieprzyk, ‘‘Universal designatedverifier signatures,’’ in Proc. 9th Int. Conf. Theory Appl. Cryptol. Inf.
Secur., in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2894. Taipei, Taiwan:
Springer, Nov./Dec. 2003, pp. 523–542.
[33] W. Susilo, F. Zhang, and Y. Mu, ‘‘Identity-based strong designated verifier
signature schemes,’’ in Proc. 9th Australas. Conf. Inf. Secur. Privacy
(ACISP), in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3108. Sydney, NSW,
Australia: Springer-Verlag, Jul. 2004, pp. 313–324.
[34] P. Thorncharoensri, W. Susilo, and Y. Mu, ‘‘How to balance privacy with
authenticity,’’ in Proc. 11th Int. Conf. Inf. Secur. Cryptol., in Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, vol. 5461. Seoul, South Korea: Springer, Dec. 2008,
pp. 184–201.
[35] P. Thorncharoensri, W. Susilo, and Y. Mu, ‘‘Policy-controlled signatures,’’
in Proc. 11th Int. Conf. Inf. Commun. Secur., in Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol. 5927. Beijing, China: Springer, Dec. 2009, pp. 91–106.
[36] P. Thorncharoensri, W. Susilo, and Y. Mu, ‘‘Universal designated verifier signatures with threshold-signers,’’ in Proc. 4th Int. Workshop Secur.
(IWSEC), in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5824. Toyama,
Japan: Springer, Oct. 2009, pp. 89–109.
[37] P. Thorncharoensri, W. Susilo, and Y. Mu, ‘‘Policy controlled system with
anonymity,’’ Theor. Comput. Sci., vol. 745, pp. 87–113, Oct. 2018.
[38] W. Yang, S. Wang, X. Huang, and Y. Mu, ‘‘On the security of an efficient
and robust certificateless signature scheme for IIoT environments,’’ IEEE
Access, vol. 7, pp. 91074–91079, 2019.
[39] Y. Zhang, R. H. Deng, D. Zheng, J. Li, P. Wu, and J. Cao, ‘‘Efficient
and robust certificateless signature for data crowdsensing in cloud-assisted
industrial IoT,’’ IEEE Trans. Ind. Informat., vol. 15, no. 9, pp. 5099–5108,
Sep. 2019.

PAIRAT THORNCHAROENSRI received the
bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering from
the King Mongkut’s University of Technology
North Bangkok, Thailand, and the M.Sc. degree
in computer science and the Ph.D. degree from the
University of Wollongong (UOW), Australia. He is
a Lecturer with the School of Computer Science
and Information Technology and a member of the
Institute of Cybersecurity and Cryptology, UOW.
His main research interests are currently focused
on privacy preservative techniques in the Internet of Things, blockchain,
cloud computing, and big data.

VOLUME 8, 2020

WILLY SUSILO (Senior Member, IEEE) received
the Ph.D. degree from the University of
Wollongong (UOW), Australia, in 2001. He has
been the Head of the School of Computing
and Information Technology, UOW, since 2015.
He was the former Head of the School of Computer
Science and Software Engineering, from 2009 to
2010, and the Deputy Director of the ICT Research
Institute, UOW, from 2006 to 2008. He is an
innovative educator and researcher. He is a Senior
Professor with the School of Computing and Information Technology,
Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences, UOW. He is the Director
of Institute of Cybersecurity and Cryptology, UOW. He has published more
than 300 articles in journals and conference proceedings in cryptography
and network security. He has served as a program committee member of
several international conferences. He was awarded the prestigious Australian
Research Council Future Fellowship, in 2009. In 2016, he was awarded
the Researcher of the Year from the UOW, for his research excellence and
contributions. His work on the creation of short signature schemes has been
well cited and it is a part of the IETF draft. He is the Editor-in-Chief of the
Information journal.

JOONSANG BAEK received the Ph.D. degree
from Monash University, Australia, in 2004. His
Ph.D. thesis was on the security analysis of signcryption. He has received great attention from
the research community. He was a Research Scientist with the Institute for Infocomm Research,
Singapore, and an Assistant Professor with the
Khalifa University of Science and Technology,
United Arab Emirates. He is a Senior Lecturer with
the School of Computer Science and Information
Technology and a member of the Institute of Cybersecurity and Cryptology,
University of Wollongong (UOW), Australia. He has published his work in
numerous reputed journals and conference proceedings. His current research
interests are in the fields of applied cryptography and cybersecurity. He has
also served as a program committee member and the chair of a number of
renowned conferences on information security and cryptography.

95031

